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Introduction
At the end of the second chapter, titled "Government in a Free Society," of Capitalism and Freedom (1962) , Milton Friedman enumerated a series of "activities currently undertaken by the government in the U.S., that cannot, so far as I can see, validly be justified in terms of the principles outlined above" (Friedman 2002 (Friedman [1962 , p. 35). The classical liberal principles expressed assigned to government the role of "rule-maker" and "umpire." Friedman's list of targets included agricultural price supports, tariffs and quotas, rent control, minimum wage rates, occupational licensing, public housing, "detailed regulation of industries," "implicit censorship and violation of free speech" arising from control of the airwaves, and compulsory social security. The appropriate free market arrangement is volunteer military forces; which is to say, hiring men to serve. There is no justification for not paying whatever price is necessary to attract the required number of men. Present arrangements are inequitable and arbitrary, seriously interfere with the freedom of young men to shape their lives, and probably are even more costly than the market alternative. (Friedman 2002 (Friedman [1962 , p. 36).
A position taken at a period when conscription barely registered in the public consciousness, Buttressed by an underlying commitment to individual freedom, he relied on economic concepts and an appeal to cost-benefit analysis. Friedman's conjecture that the social cost of the draft exceeded that of the voluntary alternative was supported by Walter Oi's work. Oi joined the Pentagon's Military Manpower Study, formed at the instigation of the Johnson Administration in 1964, which considered the feasibility of the all-volunteer alternative.
Although suppressed and overshadowed by the War, the study laid the groundwork for those subsequent, particularly in the Gates Commission, and engaged professional economists.
Central to Friedman and Oi's analysis was understanding conscription as an "implicit tax" on draftees and fully accounting for the opportunity costs arising from the draft's perverse incentives. This compelling logic would eventually be explicitly accepted by the Gates Commission report.
Friedman disseminated his case to a number of audiences, not the least of which included the public through multiple Newsweek articles and a The New York Times Magazine piece.
Within the conservative movement, Friedman gained adherents from within the New Right.
He shied away from the contentious discussions over draft resistance and opposition to the 
The Quadrangle Club
At a dinner of symbolic importance at the University of Chicago's Quadrangle Club in the Spring of 1962, Milton Friedman gathered with student members of the university's Intercollegiate Society of Individualists chapter to honor Friedrich Hayek. Hayek would soon leave his appointment at the Committee on Social Thought to depart for the University of Freiburg (Ebenstein 2001, p. 213) . Capitalism and Freedom appeared on shelves later the same year and Friedman soon after assumed the role as the intellectual head of the Mont Pelerin Society, founded by Hayek in 1947. In Burgin's account, the dinner represents the transition from the defense of classical liberal ideas in the immediate postwar intellectual climate to advocacy on the offensive behind Friedman's lead (Burgin 2012 Knight, Jacob Viner, Henry Simons, and Hayek at the University of Chicago, that "served to channel and direct" the resurgence of "interest in the philosophy of classical liberalism" (Friedman 1981, p. ix) .
At the time, New Individualist Review formed a feature of the landscape of the Cold War conservative movement and its fused elements of free market politics, traditionalism, and anti-communism. On the pages preceding the excerpt from Capitalism and Freedom, the first issue of New Individualist Review contained an editorial that laid out the intents of the editors. It read: "We believe in free, private enterprise, and in the imposition of the strictest limits to the power of government" (Raico 1961, p.) . Invoking an older intellectual heritage, the editorial continued: "The philosophy which we advocate is that which was shared by some of the greatest and deepest political thinkers of modern times -by Adam Smith, Burke, Bentham, Herbert Spencer" (Raico 1961, p.) . The statement concluded that "the viewpoints presented will generally be libertarian or conservative, but we will consider for publication any essay which includes a reasoned concern for freedom, and a thoughtful valuation of its importance" (Raico 1961, p. ) . Reflecting this diversity, the inaugural issue also contained an analysis of the prospects for a Barry Goldwater Presidency by John Weicher, a University of Chicago economics graduate student. The prior year, 1960, Weicher had attended the founding of the influential conservative campus activist group the Young Americans for Freedom at Buckley's home in Sharon, Connecticut (Andrew 1997, p. 293 Given that such situations as the voluntary contractualization of parties to a mutually beneficial agreement… can be classed under the heading of "coercion" within Hayek's system, and that what appear to be clear cases of coercive governmental action, such as conscription, are deemed legitimate and in accordance with the Rule of Law, it would seem that Hayek's position on the nature of coercion and freedom must, as it stands, be rejected. (Hamowy 1961a, p. 
31)
As the coup de grace of his argument, Hamowy pointed out that Hayek's conclusion accommodating conscription "differs radically from that once made by Mr. William F.
Buckley, Jr., that 'conscription is the most naked form which tyranny assumes in our society today…'" (Hamowy 1961a, p. 30) . In his response the following issue, Hayek did not recant.
Rather, he contended: "It is at least possible (to mention an extreme case which is the cause of one of Mr. Hamowy's chief complaints) that the use of so severe a form of coercion as conscription may be necessary to ward off the danger of worse coercion by an external enemy" (Hayek 1961, p. 28) . Revealing the gravity of his "worse than Buckley" charge against Hayek, Hamowy would set his sights on Buckley and the National Review in the third issue of New Individualist Review "for leading true believers in freedom and individual liberty down a disastrous path…" demonstrated by McCarthyism and for labelling "a Communist or Communist dupe" "anyone who dares to raise a principled voice against conscription" (Hamowy 1961b, p. 5 Republicans will end the draft altogether, and as soon as possible! That I promise you!" (Witherspoon 1993, p. 178) . As Schneider (1999) (Klatch 1999, p. 69) . Rand publicly supported Goldwater through her newsletters, drawing a number of her followers into the campaign. One of Goldwater's foremost speechwriters, Karl Hess, was a veteran of the Nathaniel Branden Institute -the Rand-controlled organization in New York City dedicated to elaborating her philosophy through seminar series and publishing. (Burns 2009, p. 205) . Milton Friedman also joined the campaign as economic adviser and campaigned for Goldwater in New York during a visiting year at Columbia University (Friedman and Friedman 1998, p. 370) . Gorham contacted H. Gregg Lewis at the University of Chicago economics department, who recommended his former student Walter Oi at the University of Washington (Rostker 2006, p. 29) . Like all Chicago economics Ph.Ds, Oi had taken Friedman's formative first-year course that inculcated students in the Chicago price theory tradition (Hammond 2010) .
Economics professor Stuart H. Altman of Brown University and Alan E. Fetcher of the Institute for Defense Analyses joined Oi on the project charged with the task to "estimate the budgetary cost of shifting from the draft to a voluntary system procurement" (Oi 1996, p. 42) . Doing so required making counterfactual predictions about military labor supply in the absence of a draft from limited data in which some enlistees did so voluntarily, others were drafted, and many -"reluctant volunteers" -preempted the draft by enlisting. The Manpower Study's final estimate put the budgetary cost at around five and a half billion dollars annually. In addition, as Oi was quick to add in his account of the study, the "report pointed out that this was an incremental budget cost that concealed the real social cost of allocating manpower to the nation's defense" (Oi 1996, p. 42) (Witherspoon 1993, p. 184) . The acceleration of the War increased opposition and ignited activism, particularly on college campuses. At the beginning of 1966, the Department of Defense announced a further increase in manpower demands of 340,000 more men. The Selective Service director, General Lewis Hershey, then divulged to the media that a student draft would be necessary and "that examinations and class standings would be restored as criteria for the deferment of college students beginning in September…" (Witherspoon 1993, p. 193) 
The University of Chicago Conference on the Draft
Friedman's contribution to the conference asked, "Why Not a Voluntary Army?" (Friedman 1967a ). The paper presented a kind of utilitarian calculus of the costs and benefits. The main sections considered the "disadvantages of compulsion and advantages of a voluntary army," the situation of a major war, the "possible disadvantages of a voluntary army," and, finally, transition to a voluntary system. Under the advantages, Friedman argued that a voluntary army, having been drawn entirely from willing enlistees, would make a more effective fighting service and would end the draft's arbitrary discrimination. Two other advantages Friedman added were removing the uncertainty faced by young men and the draft's effects on the larger community. The former would allow those otherwise subject to the draft "to plan their schooling, their careers, their marriages, and their families in accordance with their own long-run interests" (Friedman 1967a, p. 202) . On the community side, colleges and universities would benefit, being freed "from the incubus of young men -probably numbering in the hundreds of thousands -who would prefer to be at work rather than in a school but who now continue their schooling in the hope of avoiding the draft" (Friedman 1967a, p. 202) . Likewise, Friedman expected a "reduction of unwise earlier marriages contracted at least partly under the whip of the draft and the probable associated reduction in the birth rate" (Friedman 1967a, p. 202) . These prospective advantages embodied a familiar economic logic. Alongside these material benefits, in principle measurable, of a voluntary army, Friedman included individual freedom. He wrote that a voluntary force "would avoid the arbitrary power that now resides in draft boards to decide how a young man shall spend several of the most important years of his life -let alone whether his life shall be risked in warfare" (Friedman 1967a, p. 201) .
To complete the ostensible cost-benefit calculation, Friedman proceeded to address the possible disadvantages of a voluntary force, which included insufficient flexibility, the political danger of a professional army, and racial imbalance among servicemen. The most important objection, however, was that the all-voluntary alternative might not be feasible to maintain a force of adequate size. Friedman conceded the possibility, but argued that the labor shortage was "evidence rather that we are now grossly underpaying our armed forces" (Friedman 1967a, p. 203) . He continued: "When the bulk of young men can command at least twice this sum in civilian jobs, it is little wonder that volunteers are so few" (Friedman 1967, p. 203) . To staff the army with volunteers, Friedman argued that pay and benefits of military service needed to be made commensurate with private sector alternatives. This would incentivize individuals to enlist. However, doing so would also seem to greatly increase the budgetary cost of a voluntary army. In this regard, Friedman cited Oi's work for numbers, presented in Oi's own conference paper, but ultimately refused to grant the disadvantage: "Whatever may be the exact figure, it is a highly misleading indication of the cost incurred in shifting from compulsion to a voluntary army" (Friedman 1967a, p. 204) . He elaborated on his meaning, which formed the core of his argument:
The real cost of conscripting a soldier who would not voluntarily serve on present terms is not his pay and the cost of his keep. It is the amount for which he would be willing to serve. He is paying the difference. This is the extra cost to him that must be added to the cost borne by the rest of us… When he is forced to serve, we are in effect imposing on him a tax in kind equal in value to the difference between what it would take to attract him and the military pay he actually receives. This implicit tax in kind should be added to the explicit taxes imposed on the rest of us to get the real cost of our Armed Forces. (Friedman 1967a, p. 204 ).
The argument relied explicitly on economic concepts: the true cost of conscription had to account for the opportunity cost in addition to the budgetary cost. Though Friedman expanded upon the twin justifications for an all-volunteer force given in Capitalism and Freedom of freedom and cost, he had dropped the invocation of the free market.
Drawing on his Pentagon work, Oi's conference paper restated the logic of the "implicit tax" and supplied empirical measurement. Although the Chicago conference convened a year and half after the completion of the 1964 Pentagon manpower study, the findings had only been released that June as part of the Assistant Secretary of Defense's testimony before Congress. As a result, Oi's figures were new to most attendees. The analysis took military labor supply predictions, and calculated, given a desired force size, the "implicit tax" imposed on draftees from elasticity estimates as the difference between their reservation wage and military pay. To this was added the opportunity costs borne by current enlistees.
All told, Oi put the economic cost of the draft at five billion dollars and predicted the budgetary cost of an all-voluntary military at eight to ten billion dollars during wartime and four to five billion in peacetime (Oi 1967a, p. 246) . It followed that if the social cost of the draft were accounted for, then the all-volunteer alternative was entirely feasible, just as
Friedman had conjectured in Capitalism and Freedom.
If the all-volunteer alternative was not considered seriously prior to the conference, the lively discussions that ensued revealed that the presentations made a compelling case.
Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier commented that "I just wanted to express a general agreement with the three panel members [Chapman, Friedman, and Oi] (Oi 1967c ). Flacks contended that "conscription is by definition alien to a genuinely free society" and criticized the draft for enabling militarism and aggrandizement of power in the Presidency (Flacks 1967, p. 10) . For Flacks, opposition to the draft could not be divorced from opposition to the Vietnam War and American foreign policy commitments, a point he tried to press Friedman on during the conference discussions: "I think that the reason that Mr. Friedman sounds unrealistic in his statement is because he's ducking that…" "those military ends for which we need one-third of our youth are inappropriate…" (Tax 1967, p. 379) . Editors Powell and Cobb contributed articles for the symposium too, the latter advocating emigration as a form of draft resistance (Cobb 1967) .
Finally, the issue contained three statements on the draft from American history in "the anti- Friedman's paper was also published in the May 1967 issue of The New Guard, the Young Americans for Freedom's national magazine (Friedman 1967d) . Accompanying
Friedman's piece were articles from Barry Goldwater -"End the Draft!" -and Russell Kirk -"Our Archaic Draft." Goldwater commented that:
I can hear the liberals and radicals screaming that this would mean an army of mercenaries. So? Isn't a doctor a mercenary? Isn't a welder who is hired for a special job? Isn't the heart of a free society the "mercenary" notion that men may hire one another to do jobs in a free exchange? And isn't that the direct opposite of an authoritarian society? Just think about it. (Goldwater 1967, p. 10) For his part, Kirk argued that transitioning to "a more compact army of volunteers" would provide a more reliable, efficient, and superior force to prosecute the Cold War "in several parts of the world simultaneously" (Kirk 1967, p. 11) . The New Guard editorial board also contributed a statement on the draft titled "Involuntary Servitude in America," and the issue contained a quote page of "prominent conservatives" and some "enlightened liberals" on the draft -Taft, Governor Ronald Reagan, Buckley, Adlai Stevenson, and John K. Galbraith among others. At the back of the issue, the classifieds advertised Young Americans for Freedom sweatshirts, "Reagan in '68" buttons, and "End the Selective Slavery System" bumper stickers to "help liberate America's youth from bondage to the State" (The New Guard, May 1967, p. 27 ). This moral-laden language opposing the draft in The New Guard A matter of mere days after the Chicago conference and just his fifth editorial overall for the weekly, Friedman addressed the draft and all-volunteer alternative. The article hit upon points covered in his conference paper and employed the same arguments, sometimes almost verbatim. He declared the status quo to be "inequitable, wasteful, and inconsistent with a free society," before noting that "on this point there is wide agreement. John K. Galbraith and Barry Goldwater, the New Left and Republican Ripon Society have all urged that conscription be abolished" (Friedman 1966, p. 100) . On the feasibility of the all-volunteer military, Friedman again emphasized the hidden "tax in kind" of conscripted service, the opportunity cost paid by servicemen, and the externalities imposed on families and institutions of higher learning from conscription.
In the early part of 1967, national attention turned to Congressional debate over the extension of the expiring Selective Service Act. At a February gathering in Washington, the Young Americans for Freedom joined with the Student for a Democratic Society and thirteen other student organizations to call "for the abolition of the draft and the encouragement of humanitarian pursuits" (The New York Times, 6 February 1967). In the House Armed Services Committee hearings, Rumsfeld pressed for a fresh study of the all-volunteer force.
He had Friedman's conference paper and The New York Times Magazine article along with
Oi's analysis added to the Congressional Record (Rostker 2006, pp. 31-32) . Senator Kennedy's subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, where Friedman was invited to testify, held hearings in March (Witherspoon 1993, p. 246 ). Kennedy's questions to Friedman were directed at the relative equity of the lottery and the voluntary alternative (Witherspoon 1993, p. 256) . In the full committee, Senator Mark O. Hatfield produced a "Proposal for a Military Manpower Procurement Bill," authored by Oi at Rumsfeld's instigation, and submitted Oi's conference paper (Witherspoon 1993, p. 263) . Representing the Young Americans for Freedom, The New Guard editor David Franke also presented a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Franke elaborated the group's position for both an all-volunteer force and victory in Vietnam, asking "let us not confuse the issue of military conscription with the opposition to the war in Vietnam" (Franke 1967, pp. 4-5) . The statement opposed national service as "slave labor" and referenced each of Goldwater, Buckley, Reagan, Kirk, Oi, and Friedman (Franke 1967, pp. 4-5) .
In the midst of the debate on Capitol Hill, Sanford Gottlieb, the director of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, joined Friedman to publicly announce the creation of the Council for a Voluntary Military on May 17. Based in Chicago, the founding members of the group included Norman Thomas, Chapman, and Karl Hess. Moreover, the Council's director was James Powell -the University of Chicago graduate student and associate editor of New Individualist Review (Witherspoon 1993, p. 265) . The New Guard announced the formation of the Council, while an advertisement ran in New Individualist Review for the "non-partisan organization" whose stated aim was "to elevate public debate on the merits of voluntarism." The same month, Friedman made his case in the pages of the The New York Times Magazine (Friedman 1967b) . The piece, which also drew heavily from the Chicago conference paper, touted the Congressional momentum and support for ending the draft from influential individuals with otherwise conflicting commitments: "Fortunately, belief in personal freedom is a monopoly of neither Republican nor Democrats, of neither conservatives nor liberals" (Friedman 1967, pp. 114) . Regardless, though they laid the necessary groundwork for the long term, these efforts were unsuccessful in the immediate term. Clear majorities in both chambers passed the four-year draft reauthorization in June of 1967, which Johnson promptly signed.
Recommendations and Reverberations
According to Martin Anderson's recollection, it was in December 1966, the same month as the University of Chicago conference, that it was suggested he join an informal group of policy advisors to Nixon, then weighing a 1968 Presidential run (Anderson 1991, p. 172) . A professor of finance at Columbia University's Graduate School of Business at the time,
Anderson was also a regular attendee of seminars at the Nathaniel Branden Institute and frequent guest at Rand's living room gatherings (Burns 2009, p. 270) . Although increasingly isolated intellectually from the circles she emerged from and politically inactive since Goldwater's defeat, Rand's influence was still formidable. In April 1967, she delivered a lecture at the Ford Hall Forum in Boston opposing conscription exclusively on moral principle: "Of all the statist violations of individual rights in a mixed economy, the military draft is the worst. It is an abrogation of rights" (Rand 1967, p. 226) . Rand maintained that conscription represented unconstitutional involuntary servitude and further placed the blame for the draft's continuance on "conservatives," "the alleged defenders of freedom and capitalism, who should be opposing the draft" (Rand 1967, p. 232) . As an insult, Rand asked: "Who brought the issue of the draft into public focus and debate, demanding its repeal? The extreme left -the Vietniks and Peaceniks" (Rand 1967, p. 232) . Congressmen (Stafford et al. 1967) , and a book by former and present University of Virginia economics graduate students published by Penguin (Miller 1968a ) (Friedman 1968a) .
Although How to End the Draft: The Case for An All-Volunteer Army listed five
Congressmen as authors, the introduction was co-signed by seventeen additional members of Congress, including House Members Rumsfeld and Thomas B. Curtis. One of the research assistants credited for the book was a Georgetown law student named Stephen E. Herbits.
The introduction clarified that their conclusion did "not call for the abolition of the draft. It concludes that to do so is impossible and undesirable today, but that there are steps which can be taken now to lead to the eventual creation of an all-volunteer Armed Forces" (Stafford et al. 1976, p. ix) . The steps were generally military pay raises. The authors lamented that it was "unfortunate" that "the first public study" of the all-volunteer army had to be undertaken by a Congressional Study Group. They pointed to the Johnson Administration's sealing of the 1964 Pentagon manpower study: "Why has not this study, and supportive data, been released for consideration by Congress and the public? Why has it been suppressed?" (Stafford et al. 1976, p. viii) .
Edited Initially questioned as economically feasible, the all-volunteer military alternative was becoming politically feasible.
The 1968 Presidential Election
A month or so from the general election on October 17, 1968, Nixon elaborated his position on the draft in a national radio address. The speech combined commitment to the war effort with moral condemnation of the draft and the economic content of Friedman's argument.
Nixon began by quoting from Senator Taft's speech that the draft "is absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty which have always been considered a part of American Democracy" (Nixon 1968, p. 3). Nixon continued: "I feel this way: A system of compulsory service that arbitrarily selects some and not others simply cannot be squared with our whole concept of liberty, justice and equality under the law" (Nixon 1968, p. 3) . He argued that the demands of "modern war" required a "highly professional, highly motivated force of men…"
with a higher level of technical and professional skill that voluntary enlistments would be sufficient to supply under the right incentives:
The principal incentives are the most obvious: higher pay and increased benefits.
The military services are the only employers today who don't have to compete in the job market. Supplied by the draft with the manpower they want when they want it, they've been able to ignore the laws of supply and demand. (Nixon 1968, p. 5) Nixon further noted that an enlisted private was paid a third of the civilian minimum wage, which highlighted "another inequity of the draft system" (Nixon 1968 , p. 5):
Our servicemen are singled out for a huge hidden tax, the difference between their
military pay and what they could otherwise earn. The draftee has been forced by his country not only to defend his neighbors but to subsidize them as well. (Nixon 1968, p. 5) He also quoted the expected cost of the all-volunteer military at five to seven billion dollars, Oi's estimate. Nixon concluded the remarkable speech:
Today all across our country we face a crisis of confidence. Nowhere is it more acute than among young people. They recognize the draft as an infringement on their liberty, which it is. To them, it represents a government insensitive to their rights, a government callous to their status as free men. They ask for justice, and they deserve it. (Nixon 1968, p. 8) While the political momentum for the all-volunteer force had been gained, on the eve of Wallis' speech, adapted into an editorial for Science magazine the following January, declared that "nothing is more opposed to our ethical, religious, and political principles than taking bodily control of a person and forcing him to submit totally to the will of others" (Wallis 1969, p. 1) . In a condensation of the arguments first made publicly by Friedman,
Wallis stated that the all-volunteer alternative "would not increase the economic cost of the war" (Wallis 1969, p. 1) . Rather, it would shift the costs "which now fall on draftees" onto the taxpayers (Wallis 1969, p. 1 (Oi 1993, pp. 44-45 (Witherspoon 1993, p. 341 ). Meckling later commented: "While the Commission was divided on the merits of voluntarism, the staff was of one mind, conscription was 'bad'" (Meckling 1990 , p. 7). Nixon's charter specified the Commission's job as "to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed for" (Gates et al. 1970, p. vii) .
Conclusion
On February 20 th 1970, just shy of a year since its creation, the Gates Commission returned its recommendations to President Nixon. Their statement read: "We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts…" (Gates 1970, iii) . The first part of the report addressed the feasibility and desirability of the all-volunteer force, while the second part contained the analyses behind their conclusions. These analyses dealt with the major concerns raised in the national debate, from racial imbalance in military service to flexibility in crises. In line with Oi's prior estimates, the Commissioners placed the budgetary cost at $4.6 billion a year, but were quick to add: "Although the budgetary expense of a volunteer armed force will be higher than the present mixed force of volunteers and conscripts, the actual cost will be lower" (Gates et al. 1970, p. 8) . The statement continued:
Men who are forced to serve in the military at artificially low pay are actually paying a form of tax which subsidizes those in the society who do not serve.
Furthermore, the output of the civilian economy is reduced… This cost does not show up in the budget. Neither does the loss in output resulting from the disruption in the lives of young men who do not serve. Neither do the costs borne by those men who do not serve, but who rearrange their lives in response to the possibility of being drafted. Taking these hidden and neglected costs into account, the actual cost to the nation of an all-volunteer force will be lower than the cost of the present force. (Gates et al. 1970, p. 9) The third chapter, titled "Conscription is a Tax," developed the first point fully, particularly the discriminatory and regressive nature of the in-kind tax. Oi later commented that the "implicit tax," the core of he and Friedman's argument going back to the 1966 University of Chicago conference, "was drummed into the heads of the commissioners" (Oi 1996, p. 45 ).
The Gates Commission recommended immediate pay increases in the interim and the cessation of the draft by July 1971. In March, Friedman announced the Commission's conclusions to the readers of Newsweek, where he reflected:
As a member of the President's commission, I was impressed by the emergence of unanimity out of initial disagreement. As our deliberations proceeded, and especially as our knowledgeable staff developed a growing body of factual evidence, it became ever clearer to all of us how superficial are most arguments in favor conscription and how inefficient conscription is both as a method of taxation and as a method of recruiting manpower (Friedman 1970, p. 90) After Congressional wrangling, military conscription came to an end and the all-volunteer armed force instituted on January 27 th , 1973.
In his memoirs over twenty-five years later, Milton Friedman reflected that "the most dramatic episode" for him of the Gates Commission work was when General Westmoreland, then Chief of Staff of the Army, testified before the Commission:
In the course of his testimony, he made the statement that he did not want to command an army of mercenaries. I stopped him and said, "General, would you rather command an army of slaves?" He drew himself up and said, "I don't like to hear our patriotic volunteers referred to as slaves." I replied, "I don't like to hear our patriotic volunteers referred to as mercenaries." (Friedman and Friedman 1998, p. 380 Commission's unanimous verdict was a fitting tribute to Friedman's efforts. In this way, the successful institution of the all-volunteer military reflected not merely Friedman's public profile or his persuasive force, but also intellectual entrepreneurship.
